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LOVE AND CULTURE

by W. B. Macomber 

Chapter Four) HOW TO WIN AT CHESS AND LIFE


The search for timeless truths, instead of how a man thinks; the Symposium as an odyssey of the life of the spirit, the life of the philosopher, the Phaedrus his love-life; my choice in a future reincarnation, and playful thoughts on time (coming to be and passing away); I duck (or miss) a tough question; a brief history of the spirit of Christianity from the Catacombs to the Auto da fe, from the Pharisee and Publican to the Medici Popes and Salem, Mass., from St. Augustine to the Grand Inquisitor; life begins at 14; the warrior, the athlete, and the philosopher; Hotspur and Falstaff, John Wayne and Oscar Wilde: the relativity of values; wie Ideen flussig werden; Rick Long on chess, greatness, and miracles.


Basically, I accuse you of being 18th century. Yes, 18th century—two centuries behind the times (applause). Why? Because you don't realize, when you say, "Come on, prof, let's get into the material," that I am the material (laughter). I'm the subject matter of the course, portrayed brilliantly by Plato 3000 years ago (laughter). That's the miracle and the marvel I discovered when I first began to teach the Symposium.


I didn't read the Symposium at all, right straight off. I read a ponderous German commentary (350 pp.) by Gerhart Kruger called Einsicht und Leidenschaft, Insight and Passion. Isn't that a marvelous title? It captures the essence of Platonic love, though actually it should be the other way around. Plato's love begins with passion (Phaedrus) and ends with insight (Socrates), which is also the pattern of Greek tragedy. Only it wouldn't sound right in German the other way around. It sounds right in English: passion and insight. Get yourself a passion and start mining it for insight. That's Plato's advice in the Symposium.

I had read the dialogue before, but without Kruger to help me see what was there. I had missed it completely. (Like Faust at a baseball game.) "Seeing is an achievement word," as Gilbert Ryle says. I had eyes to see, and saw not. Well, I began teaching the Symposium and taught it about five times in classes and tutorials, starting from Kruger's monumental commentary. Otherwise I would never have gotten into it at all, I fear. I owe the Symposium to Gerhart Kruger and always will love him for that.


As I taught the dialogue again and again, my interpretation of the speeches became clearer and clearer, more and more determinate, bolder and bolder. The speeches began to hang together in a pattern, and the pattern became clearer and clearer, until gradually I began to suspect, and then realize, that the pattern was me. Bergman uses this technique in Persona, with a young boy in a sanitarium—puer aeternus (as I heard the night before last), the "eternal  youth"—in a morgue, and he rises from his cart, or whatever it is one has in a morgue, and begins feeling about a huge screen, and as he's feeling the blank screen, gradually a form takes shape underneath his fingers and becomes more and more definite until it's clearly a face, and it's the face of his mother. I had this experience teaching the Symposium, as I gradually became aware, or more and more aware, of what the dialogue was about—and, lo and behold, it was me.

The life of the philosopher is what is depicted in the Symposium. The love-life of the philosopher is depicted in the Phaedrus. In the Symposium we see the philosopher more or less alone, all by himself. We see his whole life-span, how it unfolds. Then in the Phaedrus we see him at his best, at his peak moment, the moment when he's most superb, enjoying life most—when he's making love in words.


The life of the philosopher is the basic plot-line of the Symposium and his love-life (his feeling for his favorite student) of the Phaedrus. That's why, when you say, "Come on, prof, let's get into the material," I want to respond: You're two centuries behind; you're 18th century, still looking for "timeless truths," impersonal truths, "content," "material." I'm the "content" of the course! Every philosopher, every teacher is the content of his course—not how the mind works but how his mind works. The life of the philosopher is portrayed in the Symposium in seven brilliant speeches, which are seven stages in the evolution of the life of the spirit, in the life of the spiritual man or the intellectual or the professor. For not everyone goes through this whole process, or at least in anywhere near the same degree.

Thus far you've heard me up here musing, holding soliloquies, pursuing "Cartesian meditation"—in a word, talking to myself. I call this the "Cartesian posture"; you've seen me in the Cartesian posture, all by myself. Today I want to engage you in dialogue, and we will move from the Cartesian posture to what I call the "Platonic posture." I'll follow you, follow your leads in your questions. Are the T.A.'s ready? Okay, screw on your thinking caps and decide what it is you want to ask me. We're talking about the first speech, Phaedrus. You can ask me about the first speech, or about myself, or pursue any of the leads I've thrown out in the first four hours.


My new technique of teaching is simply to come into class and have the students direct questions at me. All I do is respond to their questions. I don't prepare anything in advance (in the Cartesian posture) to "lay on" them. I maintain that the professors are already over-prepared, and further preparation is catastrophic. We must give up preparation and drudgery, and rejoice in and enjoy ourselves, we professors. (Laughter; one applauds loudly.) That's an "altruist." (Chuckles.) He applauds the thought that his professors enjoy themselves. Bravo! I applaud.

I want to say: We don't have to forge light, we are light. My colleagues with their brilliantly trained, honed minds, and the cultivated hearts which go with them. The heart, not of William Jennings Bryan, but of Clarence Darrow (old free-thinker, free-lover), the cold rationalist who could chop a man to pieces with words—that's Clarence Darrow for the defense. He has a finely honed, rational mind—he's just mind, mind, mind—but he has a heart bigger than the Ritz. Sometime read a book called Bryan and Darrow at Dayton, if you think I exaggerate the conflict between religion and philosophy; Shakespeare couldn't have done it any better.


"What would you like to be reincarnated as?" Oh, in another birth? Precisely myself (laughter, applause). I would be dreadfully disappointed if it were anyone else (laughter). These questions are playful, you know, these questions of the afterlife. The fabric of this vision is baseless, and all we can say is that our little lives are rounded by a sleep. (How many people have heard those words, thrilled to them and not understood them?) But as modern science suggests that space must somehow be curved, must somehow curve back into itself, so that it's both finite and infinite, like the surface of a sphere (which you will never reach the end of with your finger)—if that's the way we now see space, curving back into itself, I can imagine that time too curves back into itself. Alan Watts has taught me that there is no moment after the moment of my death. That is a category-confusion. What happens, then, at the moment of my death? It could be that, at the moment of my death, the time of my life curves back into itself, and I am born again, precisely like the last time, in
Redlands, California on July 13, 1929. Friday the 13th in the year of the Great Depression (laughter). From there on it could only go up (laughter). This is the myth with which Friedrich Nietzsche will replace the Christian myth of personal salvation in an afterlife, in "another world," in "heaven"—the myth of the "eternal recurrence."

Eternal recurrence: you have lived and will live an infinite number of times precisely as you are living now. Now, what is the force of that? It doesn’t make any sense, any more than heaven or reincarnation, but what is it meant co do? Presumably to make your experience weightier, to encourage you to give greater dignity to your experience, because in the western tradition we have extolled only those things which are "eternal," not things which come to be and pass away, and are called "ephemeral." I say if you exalt eternal things over passing things, it only means you prefer triangles to roses. I can't see that the triangle is of a higher being than the rose, because it doesn't change, but remains eternally fixed, while the rose is a thing of the moment. Sir Kenneth Clark says that, in the 18th century, we discovered that pleasure was fleeting, and therefore to be taken very seriously. You need to give weighting to your lives, apparently, because you don't take yourselves seriously. Your tradition has made this difficult. Nothing has any value, or "makes any sense," if it's just for now, or just for you. (Phaedrus has this attitude.) So Nietzsche presumably wants to give your life greater dignity when he says you can't imagine it having an end, or as anything but an utterly self-contained absolute. Parmenides says the same thing at the very beginning of western philosophy: You are absolute; you're not in anything, everything is in you. You have only to close your eyes and you obliterate the world.


So playfully I imagine that our lives might curve back into themselves. But does it make any difference? (That's always William James' question.) You see, there's no real cognitive difference between "one" and "infinite." We understand both only in contrast to the determinate numbers, 2 to n. "One" isn’t properly a number. In many languages it's synonymous with the indefinite pronoun:
ein Mann, un homme, one man or a man. So it really makes no difference whether you live your lives an infinite number of times or once, uniquely, for all time. In either case, your life is "eternal” in some sense, and we try to search for that eternal dimension and realize it. That's what philosophy is all about.

"Could you say something about the similarities between what you told us on Wednesday and the life of Stephen Dedalus in Portrait of the Artist?" Yes. Let’s see, if it was only gradually that I discovered that the Symposium was about me, and then the Phaedrus, it's astonishing that I could read James Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, when I was 24, and not see any connection between that novel and my life. The novel is about a Jesuit high school in Dublin in 1904, and I was in a Jesuit high school in Los Angeles in 1942, and Joyce gave the most magnificent portrayal of my high school life I could imagine. He caught all the types, caught them whole and entire, held them in living eternity—all the types. That was my high school, as well as his, Loyola High School of Los Angeles, as well as Clongowes College, County Kildare, and I didn't realize it, didn't see any connection when I read the book the first time. That, I think, was because I didn't take myself sufficiently seriously, as an object of literature, couldn't see any comparison between an object of literature and my own lived experience. Thank you, that's interesting because I meant to make the point about the Portrait of the Artist after I talked about finding myself in the Symposium and then I forgot about it.


In my thinking do I distinguish between Catholicism and basic Christianity? No, to me Christianity begins in Catholicism. We're all Roman Catholics until the end of the 16th century, or whenever. Then we have the Protestant renewal, which is quite properly a "renewal." In the beginning, the Church is individualistic, hostile to civil power (the
Roman Empire), and extremely anti-sensual. Then in the long course of the Middle Ages there's a complete turning in the Church, so that Christianity comes to be woven into the official structure, the feudal structure, as the pillar of society and the establishment. It is now no longer civil Rome over against Christianity in the Catacombs; Christianity is the power structure. The Church becomes less individualistic and more feudalistic, familial—earthy in that sense. At this point the Protestant renewal draws us back to the ("heavenly") beginning of Christianity. The Protestant reformers—the Puritans, the Calvinists—are more negative toward the body and women and sex than the Catholics. They rail against sensuality. They are the new path of individualism. Individualism is pursued by the Nordic North, which goes Protestant, not by the sensual South, which remains Catholic. Individualism in the South is a matter of cuckold, associated with sexuality—how low-level! So in the end, amazingly, there's an eruption of sensuality in the Catholic Church—naked bodies, cupids, joy bursts into the rococo churches of Bavaria and Austria in the 18th century. I hope I can show you that program of Sir Kenneth Clark's. Meanwhile the Protestants go for stern churches without any decoration. (It's like the way men and women dress at formal parties.) Get the statuary out! Get the stained glass out! Get the incense out! Smash the organs! As Sir Kenneth says, organ-smashing was the great indoor sport of Northern Germany in the 18th century (laughter). Out of religious fervor we smashed organs in the name of Christ Jesus, our Lord. What madness is loose upon the world?

"Why is Phaedrus the first speaker rather than Socrates, the philosopher"? Because you have to work up to the philosopher. The philosopher isn't going to tell us about the world, surprisingly. He's going to tell us about talking about the world, how we see the world and live in it, and consequently we can't get Socrates unless we get the speeches which lead up to him. This is where all the commentators fall on their faces. They leap right over all the first speeches to get to Socrates, because it's presumed he has "the truth." But all Socrates does is comment on the other speeches and their order, the connections between them and the  unified pattern which they finally exhibit.


This is what Hegel does with the history of philosophy in his
Phenomenology of Spirit. He doesn't want to give us a new philosophy, he tells us—there are already enough of them. He wants to get the ones we already have into some order, so that we can see what they're all about. So that we understand we don't have to be this or that: an empiricist or a rationalist, a Freudian or a Marxist, for the ontological argument or against it.

I could never have discovered Plato when I was your age. It was out of the question. I read him, but he didn't make any sense to me at all. I began to understand him when I could understand him, after I had wrestled with German philosophy from Kant through Hegel and Heidegger, and was familiar with a great deal of the history of philosophy. Mediaeval philosophy was my initial orientation until I was 26. Then I became deeply immersed in Hobbes, Kant, Freud, and Heidegger. I became a Kantian, a Freudian, and a Heideggerian. And finally Plato came zinging through to me, drawing all the rest together. But I couldn't have gotten it straight off. I had to stand on other men's shoulders—giants' shoulders—to finally reach up to Plato. That explains why Socrates comes last.


Why Phaedrus comes first is because it all begins in adolescence and Phaedrus is the archetypal adolescent. We see here the eruption suddenly of the individual life, the spiritual life, in adolescence, in high school. In
Portrait of the Artist we have a page and a half of infancy and childhood, and in the middle of p. 2—bang!—we're in high school. There are two classic approaches to this matter which I identify with Freud and Sartre. For Freud it's all over when you're 5; for Sartre it all begins at 14. You pay your money and you take your choice. Plato, of course, is on Sartre's side; it all begins at 14. (But Freud is not wrong.)

It all begins with the dream of adolescence, the dream of transcendence, of glory and splendor, which young Phaedrus puts into words. Phaedrus is the initial irruption of individuality, and philosophy is the effort to cope with the problem of individuality, to learn to think for oneself. Not everyone is called to think for himself, I might add. Philosophy is not for everyone. My mother—bless her!—never "thought for herself," and thank God! She was too busy working, and believing in the Catholic Church and her kids—in me.


So that's why we have to begin with Phaedrus in order finally to reach the philosopher. So when Socrates pulls his remarks together at the end of his speech, in his peroration, he looks right across the table at Phaedrus and says, "Phaedrus, and you others . . ." As though he included the rest of his audience by a kind of afterthought: ". . . and you others." Talking directly across the table at the adolescent, the young dreamer—the old dreamer to the young dreamer. The others are invited to overhear if they can, but they might as well be listening at a keyhole: “Phaedrus (and you others) . . ."

Philosophers have been called "dreamers"—and that is precisely what we are. We're dreamy—dreamy in the same way that, for the little girl in high school, the star halfback is dreamy, or for the halfback the drum-majorette. Philosophers are really dreamy in that way! I daydream with Hegel, dear old G.W.F.  Hegel—I'm daydreaming with him all the time. Plato is particularly dreamy—that is to say, he sets me dreaming: of what life might be, of what it is, when one is reading Plato (or Shakespeare). At the end of Socrates' speech it's as though all the adults fall away and the philosopher talks to the adolescent all by himself. (In the Phaedrus the company actually does drop away, and we see the philosopher and the adolescent alone together.) At the moment they're at this exciting dinner-party in Athens. You are there. The very words that rang in that room ring in your ears; you hear precisely what Agathon heard, and Eryximachus, and Pausanias, and young Phaedrus, who's lucky to be there at all (like you). This is big-time company. It's like B. F. Skinner, Buckminster Fuller, Sartre, Oscar Wilde, and me (laughter)—it's that type of company. Phaedrus is there because Eryximachus is in love with him. And a good thing, too, for it's he who says: let's talk about love. "What should the topic of discussion be tonight"? Young Phaedrus says, "Let the topic be love," because he's the young dreamer, with his head filled with dreams of love, and it's good to keep the old men talking about love—it makes them younger, it sensualizes them. Can you imagine Richard Nixon at a party like that? (Laughter.)


Oh yes (slides on screen), that's a frieze on a tomb. If we keep switching them you'll see two other sides. I have three sides of that frieze. Ah, this is the first form which heroism takes—sorry, the second form—those splendid athletes. I will trace the evolution of heroism, when I get around to it. The warrior is the first manifestation of the "superior man."

Who is a superior man? All culture hinges on this: who and what is superior? The first man to be superior is the warrior, who stands his ground in battle. That's what we expect a man to do! Ecce homo! England expects every man to do his duty. Our word ''virtue” comes from the Latin virtus, which means courage, the superiority men display in battle. Virtue has the same root as virility, virile. It's manliness, what makes a man a "real man." (Vir is Latin for "man.") Not the vir of virgin. (The word "virgin," as the Germans say, is an anomaly, with vir already in there: da steckt der vir schon drin.) Someone once said that the tragedy of our age is that a word which initially stood for courage in a man comes to stand for chastity in a woman (laughter): a "woman of virtue," a woman who says no. Battle is where the archetypal “No!” is appropriate: They shall not pass! (The inordinate Christian concern with sex, and self-abnegation, is a sheer distraction.) So the Greek word for excellence is arete, from Ares, the god of war.


The first "superior man" is the man who stands his ground when our collective fate depends on it. That's a man; that's a real man! Ecce homo! It beats definition—fulfilling requirements. The war hero is Achilles, on whose powers and skill and cunning and courage the fate of all
Greece depends. The warrior hero is Achilles, David, Charlemagne, El Cid, Robin Hood, Harry Hotspur, Dwight Eisenhower, John Wayne, Westy Westmoreland. Society naturally forms around him, as around Winston Churchill, J.P. Morgan, Colonel William Hollister, the "big man." You'll find it in Shakespeare, where "Old Norway" is likely to walk into the room. Old Norway: your knees should quake.

Then, under conditions of leisure and power and affluence, we move from the warrior to the athlete, from the action (the real action) to the stylized deed or gesture which is appreciated in and for itself, so that it makes no sense to talk of a "sincere athlete." Now "superior" has come to mean something quite different—not the most brutal, ruthless, powerful man. Culture begins when power checks (or inhibits) itself. "Please." "Thank you." "After you." Apr'es vous. Merci. Danke schon. That's culture.


And from the stylized deed or gesture we move to the word, and the third hero in ancient
Greece becomes the orator, the tragedian, the philosopher: Demosthenes, Sophocles, Socrates. Darwin has traced this same evolution in the animal kingdom. There are species of birds, he says, where conflict is sublimated into "displays of plumage and contests of song." How marvelous! "Conflict": that's the warrior. "Displays of plumage": that's the athlete. "Contests of song": that's the philosopher. It's the evolution of the Greek hero from the powerful (or dangerous) body to the perfect (or pleasing) body, to the powerful or pleasing mind.

Athletes and philosophers—those perfect specimens of body and  mind—do occur in other cultures, but more or less at random, as Nietzsche says. Both are typically, supremely Greek—Greek discoveries, Greek ideals. All Greek culture, Nietzsche argues, pushes systematically towards producing these two supreme types—on a scale which admits of comparison only between a small city over centuries and entire continents and civilizations over millennia. Hegel says we must make ideas fluid, must make them move. I've just made three ideas move, a warrior, an athlete, a philosopher.


The last time I looked up, there were a pair of athletes about to square off, just for the fun of it—those superb bodies. Now we see contest again. Probably at school or something, perhaps in the academy, a contest between two animals, one always smaller than the other, as one of the chaps is smaller than the other—the smaller one the favorite, no doubt  (chuckles).

Greek greatness depended on the worship of the athlete and the philosopher. Nietzsche says no other culture has systematically produced athletes and philosophers. Other cultures have had them, but they were accidents. Greece produced them systematically. The athlete is the living instantiation of God. He's built into the divine statuary. Why? Because in sports we see the living manifestation of the divine miracle, that man can transform himself through his own effort, by practice and training and skill and devotion. The athlete shows us this in the flesh. We all see it! It doesn't take any specially trained vision to realize that it's absolutely impossible to run a mile under 4 minutes—that is not possible. And all the achievements of athletes in the games, in the stadium—they're all impossible "by nature." Only by culture can they be realized, by 5 or 10 years of training, 15 hours a day. That's the miracle of culture, the transformation of nature through human art and skill and care and cunning. I enjoy using all these words because I want to promote them, keep them alive.


The athlete symbolizes human potentiality. We don't have to know a lot to appreciate his greatness. You have to know a lot to appreciate Euripides' greatness, or Sophocles', or Socrates'; it's not right on the surface. You have to listen to Socrates. You can't see his greatness. Until, perhaps, after you've listened for a long time. Then you can see his greatness too, right on the surface, in that statue I showed you. You can see the greatness of Socrates in the statue of Marsyas, but only after you know about him, only after you've listened to him. With the athlete who wins at the games, you see his greatness—there's nothing hidden, no
noumenon (which Kant finds "behind" everything). Why does Tommy Lymperopoulos win races? Why, because he takes larger steps and takes them more quickly (laughter). And why do Rick Long's chess pieces always seem to be at just the right places? Because he selects the proper square (one cannot exercise too much care in choice) and puts them there. And the secret of Bach's genius at the organ, as he himself tells us? "It's quite simple, really. You simply strike the right notes at the right time, and the instrument plays itself!” Everyone can see that; nothing is hidden. There's no mystery—except the mystery of training. That's why the athlete is worshipped as divine, along with the perfect form of the woman, the Aphrodite of Melos (or so-called "Venus  di Milo"), whom I will also show you.

Yes, next question. "What do you think the purpose of the world is?" Well, I quoted Conrad, "I suspect that the aim of creation cannot be ethical at all." That is to say, good as opposed to evil, right as opposed to wrong, and so on, are not inherently manifest in the natural world. These judgments are introduced with culture. And culture heightens and transforms human nature. In striving to be a cultured man, a good man, I am also striving to be a great man. As Long says, "Greatness is a social category." Greatness exists only where there is society, and in the minds of the people who share that society. Shakespeare is great in Elizabethan England and Elizabethan literature. But as a man, he's no better than any other man—a man's a man for a' that and a' that.


I submit the Greeks to your judgment on the grounds that they were especially cultured men. They were cultured in the sense that they were great at so many things. They were exceedingly good at history, at epic and lyric poetry, mathematics, tragedy and comedy, philosophy, architecture, sculpture, politics, oratory, sport. At almost anything you can name, all Europe strives for 2,000 years to reach up to the level of
Athens, a city about the size of Santa Barbara.

The only comparison for a Greek city, Athens, is not a nation over centuries; it's Europe over two millennia. Who are the great tragedians? Sophocles, Aeschylus, Euripides, Goethe, Shakespeare, Ibsen (?). What are the great epics? The Iliad, the Odyssey, the Aenid, the Divine Comedy, Paradise Lost. The appropriate comparison is Athens and Europe—Athens in two centuries, Europe in 20.


The works of Aristotle are re-discovered in the 12th century, having been lost since the time Roman soldiers plundered Greece and Alexandria. (They'd gone into hiding.) The writings of Aristotle are exhumed in the 12th century and brought into currency again, and suddenly Europe leaps forward in science. Everything Europe had achieved over a thousand years is simply void when we discover Aristotle, because one man did it better in a lifetime than a continent could in a millennium. (And then we start blindly following a Christianized Aristotle.) So I'm going to portray Greece to you as a miracle—although miracles are not ordinarily my "bag." Except the "miracle" we all witness at athletic contests and in great works of art.I say if you want a miracle, look at Marathon! That's a real, honest-to-God miracle. How could Santa Barbara standing alone (without the help of Ventura and Oxnard and San Luis Obispo, defeat the full power of the Russian Empire? I call that a miracle. As for Christian miracles, as Long says again, "The one authenticated miracle of Christianity is the Bible." How Christian values came to dominate the world is a mystery which I believe the Greek logos will never completely penetrate.

 

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