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LOVE AND CULTURE
by W. B.
Macomber
Chapter Four) HOW TO WIN AT
CHESS AND LIFE
The
search for timeless truths, instead
of how a man thinks; the Symposium as an odyssey of the life of the
spirit, the
life of the philosopher, the Phaedrus his love-life; my choice in a
future
reincarnation, and playful thoughts on time (coming to be and passing
away); I
duck (or miss) a tough question; a brief history of the spirit of
Christianity
from the Catacombs to the Auto da fe, from the Pharisee and Publican to
the
Medici Popes and Salem, Mass., from St. Augustine to the Grand
Inquisitor; life
begins at 14; the warrior, the athlete, and the philosopher; Hotspur
and Falstaff,
John Wayne and Oscar Wilde: the relativity of values; wie Ideen flussig
werden;
Rick Long on chess, greatness, and miracles.
Basically, I
accuse you of being 18th century. Yes, 18th century—two
centuries behind the
times (applause). Why? Because you don't realize, when you say, "Come
on,
prof, let's get into the material," that I am the material (laughter).
I'm
the subject matter of the course, portrayed brilliantly by Plato 3000
years ago
(laughter). That's the miracle and the marvel I discovered when I first
began
to teach the Symposium.
I didn't
read
the Symposium at all, right straight
off. I read a ponderous German commentary (350 pp.) by Gerhart Kruger
called Einsicht
und Leidenschaft,
Insight
and Passion.
Isn't that a marvelous
title? It captures the essence of Platonic love, though actually it
should be
the other way around. Plato's love begins with passion (Phaedrus) and
ends with
insight (Socrates), which is also the pattern of Greek tragedy. Only it
wouldn't sound right in German the other way around. It sounds right in
English: passion and insight. Get yourself a passion and start mining
it for
insight. That's Plato's advice in the Symposium.
I had read the
dialogue before, but without Kruger to help me see what was there. I
had missed
it completely. (Like Faust at a baseball game.) "Seeing is an
achievement
word," as Gilbert Ryle says. I had eyes to see, and saw not. Well, I
began
teaching the Symposium and taught
it
about five times in classes and tutorials, starting from Kruger's
monumental
commentary. Otherwise I would never have gotten into it at all, I fear.
I owe
the Symposium to Gerhart Kruger and
always will love him for that.
As I taught
the
dialogue again and again, my interpretation of the speeches became
clearer and
clearer, more and more determinate, bolder and bolder. The speeches
began to
hang together in a pattern, and the pattern became clearer and clearer,
until
gradually I began to suspect, and then realize, that the pattern was
me.
Bergman uses this technique in Persona,
with a young boy in a sanitarium—puer
aeternus (as I
heard the night before last), the "eternal
youth"—in a morgue, and he rises from
his cart, or whatever it is one has in a morgue, and begins feeling
about a
huge screen, and as he's feeling the blank screen, gradually a form
takes shape
underneath his fingers and becomes more and more definite until it's
clearly a
face, and it's the face of his mother. I had this experience teaching
the Symposium, as I gradually became aware,
or more and more aware, of what the dialogue was about—and,
lo and behold, it
was me.
The life of the
philosopher is what is depicted in the Symposium.
The love-life of the philosopher is depicted in the Phaedrus.
In the Symposium
we see the philosopher more or less alone, all by himself. We see his
whole life-span,
how it unfolds. Then in the Phaedrus
we see him at his best, at his peak moment, the moment when he's most
superb, enjoying
life most—when he's making love in words.
The life of
the
philosopher is the basic plot-line of the Symposium
and his love-life (his feeling for his favorite student) of the Phaedrus. That's why, when you say,
"Come on, prof, let's get into the material," I want to respond:
You're two centuries behind; you're 18th century, still looking for
"timeless truths," impersonal truths, "content," "material."
I'm the "content" of the course! Every philosopher, every teacher is
the content of his course—not how the mind works but how his
mind works. The
life of the philosopher is portrayed in the Symposium
in seven brilliant speeches, which are seven stages in the evolution of
the
life of the spirit, in the life of the spiritual man or the
intellectual or the
professor. For not everyone goes through this whole process, or at
least in
anywhere near the same degree.
Thus far you've
heard me up here musing, holding soliloquies, pursuing "Cartesian
meditation"—in a word, talking to myself. I call this the
"Cartesian
posture"; you've seen me in the Cartesian posture, all by myself. Today
I want
to engage you in dialogue, and we will move from the Cartesian posture
to what
I call the "Platonic posture." I'll follow you, follow your leads in
your questions. Are the T.A.'s ready? Okay, screw on your thinking caps
and
decide what it is you want to ask me. We're talking about the first
speech,
Phaedrus. You can ask me about the first speech, or about myself, or
pursue any
of the leads I've thrown out in the first four hours.
My new technique
of teaching is simply to come into class and have the students direct
questions
at me. All I do is respond to their questions. I don't prepare anything
in advance
(in the Cartesian posture) to "lay on" them. I maintain that the
professors are already over-prepared, and further preparation is
catastrophic.
We must give up preparation and drudgery, and rejoice in and enjoy
ourselves,
we professors. (Laughter; one applauds loudly.) That's an "altruist."
(Chuckles.) He applauds the thought that his professors enjoy
themselves.
Bravo! I applaud.
I want to say:
We don't have to forge light, we are light. My colleagues with their
brilliantly
trained, honed minds, and the cultivated hearts which go with them. The
heart,
not of William Jennings Bryan, but of Clarence Darrow (old
free-thinker,
free-lover), the cold rationalist who could chop a man to pieces with
words—that's
Clarence Darrow for the defense. He has a finely honed, rational
mind—he's just
mind, mind, mind—but he has a heart bigger than the Ritz.
Sometime read a book
called Bryan and Darrow at Dayton,
if
you think I exaggerate the conflict between religion and philosophy;
Shakespeare
couldn't have done it any better.
"What would
you like to be reincarnated as?" Oh, in another birth? Precisely myself
(laughter, applause). I would be dreadfully disappointed if it were
anyone else
(laughter). These questions are playful, you know, these questions of
the
afterlife. The fabric of this vision is baseless, and all we can say is
that
our little lives are rounded by a sleep. (How many people have heard
those
words, thrilled to them and not understood them?) But as modern science
suggests that space must somehow be curved, must somehow curve back
into
itself, so that it's both finite and infinite, like the surface of a
sphere
(which you will never reach the end of with your finger)—if
that's the way we
now see space, curving back into itself, I can imagine that time too
curves
back into itself. Alan Watts has taught me that there is no moment
after the
moment of my death. That is a category-confusion. What happens, then,
at the
moment of my death? It could be that, at the moment of my death, the
time of my
life curves back into itself, and I am born again, precisely like the
last
time, in Redlands,
California on July 13, 1929. Friday the
13th
in the year of the Great Depression (laughter). From there on it could
only go
up (laughter). This is the myth with which Friedrich Nietzsche will
replace the
Christian myth of personal salvation in an afterlife, in "another
world," in "heaven"—the myth of the "eternal
recurrence."
Eternal
recurrence: you have lived and will live an infinite number of times
precisely
as you are living now. Now, what is the force of that? It
doesn’t make any
sense, any more than heaven or reincarnation, but what is it meant co
do?
Presumably to make your experience weightier, to encourage you to give
greater
dignity to your experience, because in the western tradition we have
extolled
only those things which are "eternal," not things which come to be
and pass away, and are called "ephemeral." I say if you exalt eternal
things over passing things, it only means you prefer triangles to
roses. I
can't see that the triangle is of a higher being than the rose, because
it
doesn't change, but remains eternally fixed, while the rose is a thing
of the
moment. Sir Kenneth Clark says that, in the 18th century, we discovered
that
pleasure was fleeting, and therefore to be taken very seriously. You
need to
give weighting to your lives, apparently, because you don't take
yourselves
seriously. Your tradition has made this difficult. Nothing has any
value, or
"makes any sense," if it's just for now, or just for you. (Phaedrus
has this attitude.) So Nietzsche presumably wants to give your life
greater
dignity when he says you can't imagine it having an end, or as anything
but an
utterly self-contained absolute. Parmenides says the same thing at the
very
beginning of western philosophy: You are absolute; you're not in
anything,
everything is in you. You have only to close your eyes and you
obliterate the
world.
So playfully I
imagine that our lives might curve back into themselves. But does it
make any
difference? (That's always William James' question.) You see, there's
no real
cognitive difference between "one" and "infinite." We
understand both only in contrast to the determinate numbers, 2 to n.
"One" isn’t properly a number. In many languages it's
synonymous with
the indefinite pronoun: ein
Mann, un homme, one man or a man. So it really
makes no difference whether you live your lives an infinite number of
times or
once, uniquely, for all time. In either case, your life is
"eternal” in some
sense, and we try to search for that eternal dimension and realize it.
That's
what philosophy is all about.
"Could you
say something about the similarities between what you told us on
Wednesday and
the life of Stephen Dedalus in Portrait
of the Artist?" Yes. Let’s see, if it was only
gradually that I
discovered that the Symposium was
about me, and then the Phaedrus,
it's
astonishing that I could read James Joyce's Portrait
of the Artist as a Young Man, when I was 24, and not see any
connection between
that novel and my life. The novel is about a Jesuit high school in Dublin in 1904, and I was in a
Jesuit high school in Los Angeles in
1942, and
Joyce gave the most magnificent portrayal of my high school life I
could
imagine. He caught all the types, caught them whole and entire, held
them in
living eternity—all the types. That was my high school, as
well as his, Loyola
High School of Los Angeles, as well as Clongowes
College,
County Kildare,
and I didn't realize it, didn't see any connection when I read the book
the
first time. That, I think, was because I didn't take myself
sufficiently
seriously, as an object of literature, couldn't see any comparison
between an
object of literature and my own lived experience. Thank you, that's
interesting
because I meant to make the point about the Portrait
of the Artist after I talked about finding myself in the Symposium and then I forgot about it.
In my thinking
do I distinguish between Catholicism and basic Christianity? No, to me
Christianity begins in Catholicism. We're all Roman Catholics until the
end of
the 16th century, or whenever. Then we have the Protestant renewal,
which is
quite properly a "renewal." In the beginning, the Church is
individualistic, hostile to civil power (the Roman Empire),
and extremely anti-sensual. Then in the long course of the Middle Ages
there's
a complete turning in the Church, so that Christianity comes to be
woven into
the official structure, the feudal structure, as the pillar of society
and the
establishment. It is now no longer civil Rome
over against Christianity in the Catacombs; Christianity is the power
structure.
The Church becomes less individualistic and more feudalistic,
familial—earthy
in that sense. At this point the Protestant renewal draws us back to
the
("heavenly") beginning of Christianity. The Protestant
reformers—the
Puritans, the Calvinists—are more negative toward the body
and women and sex
than the Catholics. They rail against sensuality. They are the new path
of
individualism. Individualism is pursued by the Nordic North, which goes
Protestant,
not by the sensual South, which remains Catholic. Individualism in the
South is
a matter of cuckold, associated with sexuality—how low-level!
So in the end, amazingly,
there's an eruption of sensuality in the Catholic
Church—naked bodies, cupids,
joy bursts into the rococo churches of Bavaria
and Austria
in the 18th century. I hope I can show you that program of Sir Kenneth
Clark's.
Meanwhile the Protestants go for stern churches without any decoration.
(It's
like the way men and women dress at formal parties.) Get the statuary
out! Get
the stained glass out! Get the incense out! Smash the organs! As Sir
Kenneth
says, organ-smashing was the great indoor sport of Northern Germany in the 18th century (laughter).
Out of religious fervor we
smashed organs in the name of Christ Jesus, our Lord. What madness is
loose
upon the world?
"Why is
Phaedrus the first speaker rather than Socrates, the philosopher"?
Because
you have to work up to the philosopher. The philosopher isn't going to
tell us
about the world, surprisingly. He's going to tell us about talking
about the
world, how we see the world and live in it, and consequently we can't
get
Socrates unless we get the speeches which lead up to him. This is where
all the
commentators fall on their faces. They leap right over all the first
speeches
to get to Socrates, because it's presumed he has "the truth." But all
Socrates does is comment on the other speeches and their order, the
connections
between them and the unified
pattern
which they finally exhibit.
This is what
Hegel does with the history of philosophy in his Phenomenology of Spirit. He doesn't want to give us a
new
philosophy, he tells us—there are already enough of them. He
wants to get the
ones we already have into some order, so that we can see what they're
all
about. So that we understand we don't have to be this or that: an
empiricist or
a rationalist, a Freudian or a Marxist, for the ontological argument or
against
it.
I could never
have discovered Plato when I was your age. It was out of the question.
I read
him, but he didn't make any sense to me at all. I began to understand
him when
I could understand him, after I had
wrestled with German philosophy from Kant through Hegel and Heidegger,
and was
familiar with a great deal of the history of philosophy. Mediaeval
philosophy
was my initial orientation until I was 26. Then I became deeply
immersed in
Hobbes, Kant, Freud, and Heidegger. I became a Kantian, a Freudian, and
a
Heideggerian. And finally Plato came zinging through to me, drawing all
the
rest together. But I couldn't have gotten it straight off. I had to
stand on other
men's shoulders—giants' shoulders—to finally reach
up to Plato. That explains
why Socrates comes last.
Why Phaedrus
comes first is because it all begins in adolescence and Phaedrus is the
archetypal
adolescent. We see here the eruption suddenly of the individual life,
the
spiritual life, in adolescence, in high school. In Portrait of the Artist we have a page and a half of
infancy and
childhood, and in the middle of p. 2—bang!—we're in
high school. There are two
classic approaches to this matter which I identify with Freud and
Sartre. For
Freud it's all over when you're 5; for Sartre it all begins at 14. You
pay your
money and you take your choice. Plato, of course, is on Sartre's side;
it all
begins at 14. (But Freud is not wrong.)
It all begins
with the dream of adolescence, the dream of transcendence, of glory and
splendor,
which young Phaedrus puts into words. Phaedrus is the initial irruption
of
individuality, and philosophy is the effort to cope with the problem of
individuality, to learn to think for oneself. Not everyone is called to
think
for himself, I might add. Philosophy is not for everyone. My
mother—bless
her!—never "thought for herself," and thank God! She was too
busy
working, and believing in the Catholic Church and her kids—in
me.
So that's why we
have to begin with Phaedrus in order finally to reach the philosopher.
So when
Socrates pulls his remarks together at the end of his speech, in his
peroration, he looks right across the table at Phaedrus and says,
"Phaedrus, and you others . . ." As though he included the rest of
his audience by a kind of afterthought: ". . . and you others."
Talking directly across the table at the adolescent, the young
dreamer—the old
dreamer to the young dreamer. The others are invited to overhear if
they can,
but they might as well be listening at a keyhole: “Phaedrus
(and you others) .
. ."
Philosophers
have been called "dreamers"—and that is precisely what we
are. We're
dreamy—dreamy in the same way that, for the little girl in
high school, the
star halfback is dreamy, or for the halfback the drum-majorette.
Philosophers
are really dreamy in that way! I daydream with Hegel, dear old G.W.F. Hegel—I'm
daydreaming with him all the time.
Plato is particularly dreamy—that is to say, he sets me
dreaming: of what life
might be, of what it is, when one is reading Plato (or Shakespeare). At
the end
of Socrates' speech it's as though all the adults fall away and the
philosopher
talks to the adolescent all by himself. (In the Phaedrus the company
actually
does drop away, and we see the philosopher and the adolescent alone
together.) At
the moment they're at this exciting dinner-party in Athens.
You are there. The very words that
rang in that room ring in your ears; you hear precisely what Agathon
heard, and
Eryximachus, and Pausanias, and young Phaedrus, who's lucky to be there
at all
(like you). This is big-time company. It's like B. F. Skinner,
Buckminster
Fuller, Sartre, Oscar Wilde, and me (laughter)—it's that type
of company.
Phaedrus is there because Eryximachus is in love with him. And a good
thing,
too, for it's he who says: let's talk about love. "What should the
topic
of discussion be tonight"? Young Phaedrus says, "Let the topic be
love," because he's the young dreamer, with his head filled with dreams
of
love, and it's good to keep the old men talking about love—it
makes them
younger, it sensualizes them. Can you imagine Richard Nixon at a party
like
that? (Laughter.)
Oh yes (slides
on screen), that's a frieze on a tomb. If we keep switching them you'll
see two
other sides. I have three sides of that frieze. Ah, this is the first
form
which heroism takes—sorry, the second form—those
splendid athletes. I will
trace the evolution of heroism, when I get around to it. The warrior is
the
first manifestation of the "superior man."
Who is a
superior man? All culture hinges on this: who and what is superior? The
first
man to be superior is the warrior, who stands his ground in battle.
That's what
we expect a man to do! Ecce homo! England
expects every man to do his
duty. Our word ''virtue” comes from the Latin virtus,
which means courage, the superiority men display in battle.
Virtue has the same root as virility, virile. It's manliness, what
makes a man
a "real man." (Vir is Latin
for "man.") Not the vir of
virgin. (The word "virgin," as the Germans say, is an anomaly, with vir already in there: da
steckt der vir schon drin.) Someone
once said that the tragedy of our age is that a word which initially
stood for
courage in a man comes to stand for chastity in a woman (laughter): a
"woman of virtue," a woman who says no. Battle is where
the archetypal “No!” is
appropriate: They shall not pass! (The inordinate Christian concern
with sex,
and self-abnegation, is a sheer distraction.) So the Greek word for
excellence
is arete, from Ares, the god of war.
The first
"superior man" is the man who stands his ground when our collective
fate depends on it. That's a man; that's a real man! Ecce homo! It
beats
definition—fulfilling requirements. The war hero is Achilles,
on whose powers
and skill and cunning and courage the fate of all Greece depends. The warrior hero is
Achilles, David, Charlemagne, El Cid, Robin Hood, Harry Hotspur, Dwight
Eisenhower, John Wayne, Westy Westmoreland. Society naturally forms
around him,
as around Winston Churchill, J.P.
Morgan, Colonel William Hollister, the "big man." You'll find it in
Shakespeare, where "Old Norway" is likely to walk into the room. Old Norway: your
knees should quake.
Then, under
conditions of leisure and power and affluence, we move from the warrior
to the
athlete, from the action (the real action) to the stylized deed or
gesture
which is appreciated in and for itself, so that it makes no sense to
talk of a
"sincere athlete." Now "superior" has come to mean
something quite different—not the most brutal, ruthless,
powerful man. Culture
begins when power checks (or inhibits) itself. "Please." "Thank
you." "After you." Apr'es
vous. Merci. Danke schon. That's culture.
And from the
stylized deed or gesture we move to the word, and the third hero in
ancient Greece
becomes the orator, the tragedian, the philosopher: Demosthenes,
Sophocles,
Socrates. Darwin
has traced this same evolution in the animal kingdom. There are species
of
birds, he says, where conflict is sublimated into "displays of plumage
and
contests of song." How marvelous! "Conflict": that's the
warrior. "Displays of plumage": that's the athlete. "Contests of
song": that's the philosopher. It's the evolution of the Greek hero
from
the powerful (or dangerous) body to the perfect (or pleasing) body, to
the
powerful or pleasing mind.
Athletes and
philosophers—those perfect specimens of body and mind—do occur in
other cultures, but more or
less at random, as Nietzsche says. Both are typically, supremely
Greek—Greek
discoveries, Greek ideals. All Greek culture, Nietzsche argues, pushes
systematically towards producing these two supreme types—on a
scale which
admits of comparison only between a small city over centuries and
entire
continents and civilizations over millennia. Hegel says we must make
ideas
fluid, must make them move. I've just made three ideas move, a warrior,
an
athlete, a philosopher.
The last time I
looked up, there were a pair of athletes about to square off, just for
the fun
of it—those superb bodies. Now we see contest again. Probably
at school or
something, perhaps in the academy, a contest between two animals, one
always
smaller than the other, as one of the chaps is smaller than the
other—the
smaller one the favorite, no doubt
(chuckles).
Greek greatness
depended on the worship of the athlete and the philosopher. Nietzsche
says no
other culture has systematically produced athletes and philosophers.
Other
cultures have had them, but they were accidents. Greece
produced them
systematically. The athlete is the living instantiation of God. He's
built into
the divine statuary. Why? Because in sports we see the living
manifestation of
the divine miracle, that man can transform himself through his own
effort, by
practice and training and skill and devotion. The athlete shows us this
in the
flesh. We all see it! It doesn't take any specially trained vision to
realize
that it's absolutely impossible to run a mile under 4
minutes—that is not
possible. And all the achievements of athletes in the games, in the
stadium—they're
all impossible "by nature." Only by culture
can they be realized, by 5 or 10 years of training, 15
hours a day. That's the miracle of culture, the transformation of
nature
through human art and skill and care and cunning. I enjoy using all
these words
because I want to promote them, keep them alive.
The athlete
symbolizes human potentiality. We don't have to know a lot to
appreciate his
greatness. You have to know a lot to appreciate Euripides' greatness,
or
Sophocles', or Socrates'; it's not right on the surface. You have to
listen to
Socrates. You can't see his greatness. Until, perhaps, after you've
listened
for a long time. Then you can see his greatness too, right on the
surface, in
that statue I showed you. You can see the greatness of Socrates in the
statue
of Marsyas, but only after you know about him, only after you've
listened to
him. With the athlete who wins at the games, you see his
greatness—there's
nothing hidden, no noumenon (which
Kant finds "behind" everything). Why does Tommy Lymperopoulos win
races? Why, because he takes larger steps and takes them more quickly
(laughter). And why do Rick Long's chess pieces always seem to be at
just the
right places? Because he selects the proper square (one cannot exercise
too
much care in choice) and puts them there. And the secret of Bach's
genius at
the organ, as he himself tells us? "It's quite simple, really. You
simply
strike the right notes at the right time, and the instrument plays
itself!”
Everyone can see that; nothing is hidden. There's no
mystery—except the mystery
of training. That's why the athlete is worshipped as divine, along with
the
perfect form of the woman, the Aphrodite of Melos (or so-called
"Venus di Milo"), whom I will
also show you.
Yes, next
question. "What do you think the purpose of the world is?" Well, I
quoted Conrad, "I suspect that the aim of creation cannot be ethical at
all." That is to say, good as opposed to evil, right as opposed to
wrong,
and so on, are not inherently manifest in the natural world. These
judgments
are introduced with culture. And culture heightens and transforms human
nature.
In striving to be a cultured man, a
good man, I am also
striving to be a great man. As Long
says, "Greatness
is a social category." Greatness exists only where there is society,
and
in the minds of the people who share that society. Shakespeare is great
in
Elizabethan England and Elizabethan literature. But as a man, he's no
better
than any other man—a man's a man for a' that and a' that.
I submit the
Greeks to your judgment on the grounds that they were especially
cultured men. They
were cultured in the sense that they were great at so many things. They
were
exceedingly good at history, at epic and lyric poetry, mathematics,
tragedy and
comedy, philosophy, architecture, sculpture, politics, oratory, sport.
At
almost anything you can name, all Europe strives for 2,000 years to
reach up to
the level of Athens, a city about the size of Santa Barbara.
The only
comparison for a Greek city, Athens,
is not a
nation over centuries; it's Europe
over two millennia.
Who are the great tragedians? Sophocles, Aeschylus, Euripides, Goethe,
Shakespeare, Ibsen (?). What are the great epics? The Iliad,
the Odyssey, the Aenid,
the Divine Comedy, Paradise Lost.
The appropriate comparison is Athens
and Europe—Athens
in two centuries, Europe
in 20.
The works of
Aristotle are re-discovered in the 12th century, having been lost since
the
time Roman soldiers plundered Greece
and Alexandria.
(They'd gone into hiding.) The writings of Aristotle are exhumed in the
12th
century and brought into currency again, and suddenly Europe
leaps forward in science. Everything Europe
had achieved over a thousand years is simply void when we discover
Aristotle,
because one man did it better in a lifetime than a continent could in a
millennium.
(And then we start blindly following a Christianized Aristotle.) So I'm
going
to portray Greece
to you as a miracle—although miracles are not ordinarily my
"bag."
Except the "miracle" we all witness at athletic contests and in great
works of art.I say if you
want a miracle, look at Marathon! That's a
real, honest-to-God miracle. How could Santa Barbara
standing alone (without the help of
Ventura
and Oxnard
and San Luis Obispo, defeat the full power of the
Russian Empire?
I call that a miracle. As for Christian miracles, as Long says again,
"The
one authenticated miracle of Christianity is the Bible." How Christian
values came to dominate the world is a mystery which I believe the
Greek logos
will never completely penetrate.
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